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Abstract
A minority game whose strategies are given by probabilities p, is replaced by
a ‘simplified’ version that makes no use of memories at all. Numerical results
show that the corresponding distribution functions are indistinguishable. A
related approach, using a random walk formulation, allows us to identify the
origin of correlations and self organization in the model, and to understand
their disappearance for a different strategy’s update rule, as pointed out in a
previous work.
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The minority game (MG), introduced by Challet and Zhang [1], addresses the problem of
self organization of a population without direct interactions between its members, but with
a feedback mechanism related with its collective behavior. Each person (dubbed ‘agent’,
because of the use of the model in economic problems) has to choose from a simple alterna-
tive, without knowing what the other agents will do. At the end of the game, there are two
groups, one for each alternative: agents belonging to the smaller group (the ‘minority’) will
be the winners. Feedback is established by a reward system for winners and losers.
Different methods to choose one or the other alternative give rise to different versions of
the model. It is usual to refer to these methods as ‘strategies’. In the following, we will use
the model proposed by Johnson et.al. [2]. In this version, each agent knows beforehand the
previous m outcomes (a ‘history’), of the game, as well as the ‘next move’ of the most recent
occurences of all 2m possibilities. What is distinctive of Johnson’s et.al. formulation is the
assignement to each of the N agents of a single number as its strategy, pj (0 ≤ pj ≤ 1): given
a history, each agent will either choose the same outcome as that stored in the memory, with
probability pj, or will choose the opposite with probability qj = 1− pj (1 ≤ j ≤ N).
Winners, i.e. those in the minority group, will gain G points (G ≡ 1 in Ref. [2] ); those
in the majority group lose a point. Strategies can be modified, following the evolution of the
game: if the number of points of an agent is below a threshold value d ≤ 0, his ‘account’
is reset to zero, and he/she gets a new strategy, whose value p′ is chosen with an uniform
probability from the interval (p−R/2, p+R/2), where |R| ≤ 2; in what follows we will use
the simpler notation p → p′ = p ± ∆p. Whenever necessary, we used reflective boundary
conditions.
Johnson et.al. have shown that, as a result of correlations, the system self organizes
mainly in two distinct groups of agents, with extreme values of their strategies: p ≈ 0 or
p ≈ 1. The frequency distribution P (p) is shown in Fig.1 [3]. Moreover, they also found
that their results did not change if memories are not updated, or even if they are randomly
chosen; a similar result was obtained by Cavagna [4] in relation with the work of Challet
and Zhang [1].
In this work, we show that a ‘simplified’ version of the model, making no use of the mem-
ories, also displays self organization, and the resulting distribution P (p) is indistinguishable
from the original model, for all odd N ≥ 3. Another approach (called ‘probabilistic’ in
what follows) serves to present a rather detailed interpretation of this MG, explaining the
mechanisms establishing correlations between the agents, and their relations with the rules
of the game. This also allows us to explain the smallness of correlations found in a previous
publication, where a different update rule of the strategies was used [5].
In our ‘simplified’ version of the model, agent j chooses one of the two options (option
“1”, say) with probability pj, or the other (option “0”) with probability qj = 1− pj, without
making recourse to any history at all. All other rules, like the determination of the minority,
the reward system, the upgrade of strategies p, etc. are the same as before. In Fig. 1 we
compare results obtained with this version and with the original formulation, for N = 101,
d = −4, R = 0.2 . A single realization of the game involved nt = 10
5 time steps, and the
distribution was averaged over ns = 10
4 samples. As it was already mentioned, both results
are indistinguishable.
Even if one lets the memories totally outside of the game, there still are many parameters
in the model (the variables G, d,N,R), and it is worth to see how it depends on these
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variables. All our simulations were made in such a way that we can assure that the expected
numerical fluctuations for the initial, uniform distribution, were small. To this end, we
requested that the standard deviation 1/
√
Nns/c be no greater than 0.02 . We always used
c=100 channels in p (each of width 0.01). Moreover, to be able to compare results for
different values of N , we have normalized all our data so that
∫
P (p)dp = 1.
We collected data for N = 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 21, 51 and 101, d = 0,−2,−4 and −5, for fixed
values of R = 0.2 , and G = 1. Figure 2 shows the density values for both extrema,
P (0), P (1) vs 1/N . It is rather clear that N = 101 is already near the ‘thermodynamic’
limit (N → ∞). Also, there is only a moderated dependence on the value of the threshold
d.
Results for the ‘simplified’ version of the model show that we need not to consider
memories, and constitute the starting point for the following development.
Our second, probabilistic, approach originated in the observation that the change of
strategies, p → p′, can be thought of as the movement of points in p space, suggesting the
formulation of the model as some kind of generalized random walk (RW). It is of some interest
to mention that there is a formal similarity of P (p) with a property of a RW; specifically,
this is the case of the expresion for the probability of the last visit to the origin, x = 0, for
such a system [6]. In the simplest version of a RW, a point moves regularly with a constant
step S, randomness being only related with the sign of S. Applied to the case of N points
randomly distributed in a one dimensional (1D) box, it produces a uniform distribution in
space, P (x) = P0. In a more general case, the probability m(x) to move a point will be,
in general, a function of position x. This would be the case, for instance, of a system with
absorbing walls, or a gas with a thermal gradient. Moreover, there are situations where
the movement needs not to be regular (in time). The stationary state would be established
when m(x)P (x) = constant.
We will consider the movement of N agents in a 1D space of probabilities, p, with a
variable step ∆p, as it was already made in Johnson’s formulation of the model. On the
other hand, we will use the set {pi, G, d} to decide if an agent moves or not. It is possible to
write µi, the probability of agent i to be in the majority, in terms of {pj}. If G = d = 0, then
it is simple to see that µi is equal to the probability m(pi) to move the agent, i.e. pi → p
′
i.
In the following we will refer to m as the mobility. Note that, in general, the actual value
of m will depend on all the pj; we choose to write m(pi) for agent i, to emphasize that its
value changes with the position of the agent in p-space. We cannot find a closed expresion
for the mobility if G and d are 6= 0; nevertheless, as the mobility must follow in general the
behavior of µ, we still can use it to describe the system’s behavior.
Let us consider the case N = 3, for simplicity. The system is characterized by the
strategies p1, p2, p3 (and qi = 1− pi). The probabilities for every agent to be in the minority
are
λ1 = p1q2q3 + q1p2p3, λ2 = q1p2q3 + p1q2p3, λ3 = q1q2p3 + p1p2q3 (1)
and the corresponding probabilities of being in the majority are µi = 1− λi.
These expressions can be easily generalized to the case of N = 2n+ 1 agents.
Introducing xi = pi/qi, yi = 1/xi, U =
∏j=N
j=1 pi, Q =
∏j=N
j=1 qi it is [7]
3
λi = xiQ(1 +
∑
k2
xk2 +
∑
k2,k3
xk2xk3 + ...+
∑
k2,k3,..,kn
xk2xk3 ...xkn)
+yiU(1 +
∑
k2
yk2 +
∑
k2,k3
yk2yk3 + ...+
∑
k2,k3,..,kn
yk2yk3...ykn) (2)
Equations(1)-(2) show that µi depends on all the strategies, {pj}. In other words, it
illustrates that the origin of correlations in the distribution P (p) can be traced back to the
rules defining the minority game.
We have made numerical simulations based on Eqs.(1)-(2), for N = 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11:
at every step of the game, an agent gains (loses) one point with probability λ (µ). This
procedure makes explicit how agents relate their behaviors through the strategies. Figure
3 shows results for N = 11, together with the corresponding results from our ‘simplified’
version. The similarity between the results obtained with both methods it is remarkable;
the small differences seen in the very narrow region near both extrema (p ≈ 0, p ≈ 1),
are probably due to the noise attributable to our simulations. This is not to say that this
approach is identical to the original model. In fact, we can only expect the probabilistic
approach to be equivalent to the ‘simplified’ version in a statistical sense, but it is not possible
to compare both methods at each time step. To illustrate this difference, notice that in this
formulation one will accept some outcomes which are not allowed in the original MG; thus,
for instance, as agents win a point with probability λi, there exists a finite probability,
Wv(N) 6= 0, that the majority of the agents can win a point, in an apparent violation of
the basic rule of the game (indeed, it can even happen that all agents are simultaneously
winners). If N = 3,
Wv(3) = λ1λ2λ3 + µ1λ2λ3 + λ1µ2λ3 + λ1λ2µ3 (3)
and similar relations for all N.
Using Eq.(2), and the generalization of Eq.(3), we calculate for a uniform distribution
that Wv(3) ≈ 0.14, while it can be estimated that Wv(∞) ≤ 0.25. Similar values are
obtained for non uniform distributions with a shape analogous to that of Fig.3.
Figure 4 has results for N = 3, d = 0,−1 and G = 0, 1. In this case, results obtained
with the ‘simplified’ version (not shown here) are indistinguishable from those coming from
Eq.(1). If G = 0, the ensuing self-organization is small; we have verified the same type of
behavior for all N ≤ 11 [8]. On the contrary, if G = 1 self-organization is very important.
In both cases, d has a smaller influence on the behavior of the system. We have included
results for N = 3, d = G = 0 in Fig. 4, because in this case m(p) = µ(p), and it is possible
to get a clear picture of the resulting (small) organization. Assume agents are numbered
so that p1 < p2 < p3, and consider the case p1 < 1/2, p3 > 1/2. It follows from Eq.(1)
that m2 > m1, m3. This describes a situation where agents near p ≈ 0 and p ≈ 1 have
a tendency to remain in their positions, while the agent in between moves more frequently.
Eventually this will change if, as a result of the movement, either p2 < p1 or p2 > p3,
increasing the accumulation of agents near p = 0 and p = 1 [9]. Incidentally, we can use this
picture to understand why the use of a different updating rule can destroy self-organization,
as previously reported by one of us [5]. Assume the same situation as before, i.e. an agent
with p2 ≈ 1/2 and high mobility, and two agents near p1 ≈ 0 and p3 ≈ 1, with smaller
mobility. If now strategies are updated using p′ = 1 − p ± ∆p, as the agent with p1 ≈ 0
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moves, he will go near p1 ≈ 1. It is easy to see from Eq.(1) that the corresponding mobilities
are m1 ≈ m3 ≈ 1 > m2. In words, correlations are broken in a single step, so that only a
very tiny indication of self-organization remains. It is worthwhile to mention that this type
of evolution can no longer be sensibly described as a random walk.
The probabilistic approach provides a natural starting point for an analytic formulation
of this model. A sample is described by a point in an N dimensional space of probabilities
pj; the set of all the ns points can be thougth of as a non interacting gas that evolves towards
a stationary distribution, driven by the rules of the game. We are presently working on the
implementation of these ideas [10].
In summary, we have made mainly two contributions to the knowledge of this version of
the MG: (i) we have shown the irrelevance of memory in the resulting self organization of
the system; in this respect, therefore, this version of the MG behaves differently than that
of [1], where it has been claimed [4] that all agents need to receive the same information,
whether it be true or false, to be able to self organize; (ii) our probabilistic formulation
proved to be a very good approximation to the model and, equally important, allows us to
understand in detail how the game’s rules establish correlations between the agents.
We thank F. Parisi for useful discussions and comments. E.B. was partially supported
by CONICET of Argentina, PICT-PMT0051; H.C. was partially supported by EC Grant
ARG/B7-3011/94/27, Contract 931005 AR.
5
REFERENCES
∗ e-mail address: burgos@cnea.gov.ar
∗∗ e-mail address: ceva@cnea.gov.ar
[1] D. Challet and Y. C. Zhang, Physica (Amsterdam) 246A, 407(1997); 256A, 514(1998)
[2] N. F. Johnson, P. M. Hui, R. Jonson and T. S. Lo, Phys.Rev. Letters 82 3360 (1999)
[3] We have chosen to display our data as discrete points, because in this form it is possible
to appreciate the small differences between all the methods used here.
[4] A. Cavagna, Phys.Rev. E59, R3783(1999)
[5] H. Ceva, Physica (Amsterdam) 277A, 496(2000)
[6] W. Feller, An introduction to probability theory and its applications, Wiley Interna-
tional, 3rd. Edition, Vol. 1, page 78 and followings
[7] Indeterminations for p = 0 or 1 are only apparent, and are vey easily eliminated.
[8] N ≈ 11 is near the limit allowed to numerical calculations, both because of the amount
of computer time involved and, more importantly, because of precision considerations
[9] It can be seen that the mean value of the initial mobility for N = 3 is 3/4; in general,
2/3 < (m1+m2+m3)/3 < 1. If all p
′s are smaller (greater) than 1/2, a similar analysis
shows that all agents will try to be near p ≈ 1/2, with a mobility m ≃ 1 − p + p2,
which is even greater than the initial value. This suggest that this configuration should
be unstable.
[10] F. Parisi, E. Burgos and H. Ceva, to be published
6
FIGURES
FIG. 1. Distribution of strategies P (p) for the original model and for our ‘simplified’ approx-
imation. N = 101, G = 1, d = −4, R = 0.2, nt = 10
5 , ns = 10
4. In the original model,
m = 3
FIG. 2. Extreme strategies P (0) and P (1) vs 1/N . Filled symbols refer to P (0), open ones to
P (1)
FIG. 3. Distribution of strategies P (p) for our two approximations.
N = 11, G = 1, d = −1, R = 0.1, nt = 10
5, ns = 10
4
FIG. 4. Distribution of strategies P (p), in the probabilistic approximation, for N = 3. Open
symbols refer to d = −1, filled symbols to d = 0. The inset shows an enlarged picture for G = 0
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